

A Victory in Intelligence War: No Aircraft Carriers Were At Pearl Harbor


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by Shigeru Shiramatsu

Traditionally, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had always been discussed as a US Intelligence failure. This book, however, reveals the striking conclusion, based on ample evidence, that it was in fact the Imperial Japanese Navy that completely lost in the "Intelligence War" leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The US Navy surpassed the IJN by far in terms of the mechanism, volume, and quality of information made available to the most senior officers swiftly through interception, decryption, and translation. It had hitherto been argued that the US could only decipher up to 10% of the IJN code JN-25B at the time of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. However, once the call signs and fleet organization had been solved, the sender, receiver, vessel name, and unit name could be identified. Indeed, this book proved, using primary sources, that the US succeeded in solving most of the call signs within a few days. Also, in regard to the Japanese radio silence, it was revealed that the aircraft carrier IJN Akagi, submarines and oil tankers did not adhere to the complete radio silence. From the Japanese diplomatic codes that had been completely deciphered and other sources such as the Japanese Naval Movement Report, this book exposes the US' s almost full apprehension in advance that Japan was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

The originality of this book lies in its suggestion of the possibility that the US military' s passive response in Hawaii was part of a deceptive operation. Between November 27th and 28th of 1941, the US military in Hawaii was instructed that "the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." The author points out that the defense organization in Hawaii suddenly became clumsier due to this instruction. First, the



movement of the US aircraft carriers was suspicious. When the Japanese launched a surprise attack, the aircraft carriers were out of the harbor, along with the other newest vessels. In particular, the timing of the aircraft carrier USS Lexington' s departure was perfect, just two days before the surprise attack.

Second, with a special order by General Marshall, B-17 bombers were sent from the US West Coast to arrive at Oahu Island at 8:00 a.m., when the surprise attack was expected. At the departure, the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air briefed and sent off the crew personally. This dispatch was aimed at confusing the radar in Hawaii. Furthermore, on the day of the surprise attack only, the officer on duty at the radar site was carefully chosen as an officer without expertise in radar, who hastily judged the Japanese aircraft heading to Pearl Harbor to be B-17s.

(From Afterword)

“Finally, I would like to comment on the lessons of the Pearl Harbor attack. Seventy years have passed since the war, yet the theory of "Japan's sneak attack" in the US and the theory of the "US's negligence" in Japan still occupy the mainstream in each country. Neither country can draw a meaningful lesson if the US considers only that they would always need to be ready against a sudden attack and Japan thinks only that Isoroku Yamamoto's revolutionary idea made the attack successful. One can truly learn from the experience only when they grapple squarely with the process leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and the events that took place at Pearl Harbor. We must understand that carrying with us into the next generation a history of the Pearl Harbor attack that adheres to the above stereotypes will benefit neither country.”

Shigeru Shiramatsu


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Biography

Shigeru Shiramatsu



Born in Shizuoka prefecture in 1943, Mr. Shigeru Shiramatsu graduated from the Shizuoka Prefectural High School of Technology in 1961. After joining Yazaki Densen Kogyo K.K. in 1961, he worked at Yazaki Resources Co., Ltd., Yazaki Parts Co., Ltd. and Yazaki Corporation, and engaged in metal analysis, development, production and purchase of gas and solar energy machines, as well as in projects abroad. After working at the automobile parts plant in Mexico beginning in 1986, Mr. Shiramatsu transferred to the Quality Control Room of the Administration Department in the Head Office in 1989, before retiring as the Vice General Manager (Councilor) of the Quality Control Room and becoming reemployed as a part-time worker. In 2007, he retired as the Quality Consultant for Outsourcing Suppliers in 2007, and in 2008, he began his investigation into the history of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mr. Shiramatsu lives in Gotenba-shi, Shizuoka prefecture.



It is deeply moving to know that the Pearl Harbor attack will be discussed hereafter as a case of successful strategic deception, rather than as the narrower issue of failure in gathering information. The revision of the history of the Second World War is steadily progressing. Finally, I would like to unconditionally congratulate the author, Mr Shiramatsu.

Ryuichi Kashiwahara, Intelligence Historian



“Overcoming the theory of Roosevelt’ s conspiracy by thorough investigation of the facts, this book puts an end to the controversy over the Pearl Harbor attack.”

Robert B Stinnett, author of Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor



Drawing from a multitude of documents found in both Japanese and American archives, this book is the result of a thorough investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack—one that convincingly challenges the conventional theory, which is allegedly based on "circumstantial evidence."

Kazuhiko Yoshida, Professor Emeritus at Kobe University, Historian

